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Abstract
Ensuring privacy of sensitive data is essential in many contexts, such as healthcare data, banks, e-
commerce, wireless sensor networks, and social networks. It is common that different entities coordinate
or want to rely on a third party to solve a specific problem. At the same time, no entity wants to publish
its problem data during the solution procedure unless there is a privacy guarantee. Unlike cryptography
and differential privacy based approaches, the methods based on optimization lack a quantification of
the privacy they can provide. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a mechanism to quantify
the privacy of a broad class of optimization approaches. In particular, we formally define a one-to-
many relation, which relates a given adversarial observed message to an uncertainty set of the problem
data. This relation quantifies the potential ambiguity on problem data due to the employed optimization
approaches. The privacy definitions are then formalized based on the uncertainty sets. The properties
of the proposed privacy measure is analyzed. The key ideas are illustrated with examples, including
localization, average consensus, among others.
Index Terms
Privacy, distributed optimization, ADMM, secured multiparty computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is central in many application domains, where parties jointly solve optimization
problems. These interactions and collaborations are desirable to gain mutual benefits. For ex-
ample, independent hospitals would like to coordinate for diagnostic decision making based
on their existing patient records. Normally, optimization solvers require public data sharing,
which substantially hinder the cooperation due to privacy concerns (e.g., privacy for patients’
records). The challenge is how to solve problems among parties, while preserving privacy of
their individual data.
P. C. Weeraddana, G. Athanasiou, M. Jakobsson, and C. Fischione with Electrical Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of
Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. J. S. Baras is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of
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2A. Problem Statement
Formally, an n-party design and decision making problem can be posed as follows:
minimize f0(x; c1, . . . , cN)
subject to g(x; c1, . . . , cN)  0
h(x; c1, . . . , cN) = 0 .
(1)
Here, f0(·) is a scalar-valued objective function of the decision variables x ∈ IRM , given the
problem data {ci}i=1:N , 1 where ci is the private data (e.g., matrices) associated with entity i.
Moreover, g(·) and h(·) are vector-valued nonlinear and affine functions, respectively.
We now pose the questions: Q1) How to quantify the privacy of the problem data {ci}i=1:N ?
Q2) How to solve problem (1), such that the “privacy” of {ci}i=1:N is preserved ?
B. Existing Approaches
An ideal answer to Q1 is perfect privacy, where no information of the original problem
data {ci}i=1:N can be extracted by a third party. However, answering Q2 with perfect privacy
is generally impossible. There is an alternative fundamental theory for answering Q1, namely,
cryptography [1], which includes a number of mechanisms to encrypt the original problem data
{ci}i=1:N . The underlying privacy definition is called semantic security [1, § 5]. Loosely speaking,
the semantic privacy means that nothing can be feasibly extracted from the encrypted data. Given
Q1 is handled by the semantic security, secured multiparty computation (SMC) [2] is a well
established framework for answering Q2. In principle, SMC is applied to almost any problem,
given that the required computations are written as a Boolean circuit, or as an arithmetic circuit.
However, the general objective and constraints of problem (1) can be complicated functions, and
therefore usually the associated solution approach become impractical [3], [4], [5, § 2.3.2].
An alternative line of research for answering Q1 considers the ǫ-differential privacy [6].
The definition allows a non-negligible information leakage, denoted by ǫ, as opposed to the
cryptographic counterpart. Roughly speaking, the standard way of accomplishing ǫ-differential
privacy for Q2 is based on a random perturbation mechanism, where the underlying subroutines
of the associated solution method is appropriately mutated by using random noise with specific
statistical properties, cf. [7]–[12]. As a consequence, there is a trade-off between the optimality
1Dimensions of ci’s, can also be problem data, which we considered known, throughout to avoid cumbersome notations.
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3of the solution of problem (1) and the desired privacy level of the problem data, quantified by
ǫ. In addition, the applicability of differential privacy based approaches for solving problem (1)
can usually be limited. Note that specifying the noise properties, such as variances to achieve
a pre-specified differential privacy is solely dependent on the sensitivity of the related functions
(e.g., objective, constraint, subgradient functions) with respect to perturbations of the problem
data. In general, quantifying such sensitivities in a closed-form is challenging. One can certainly
compute some bounds. However, unless the bounds are tight, the noise variance computed based
on the bounds will be over estimated, which in turn can degrade the optimality of the solution
significantly [6], [7], [12].
As opposed to the cryptography and differential privacy based methods discussed above,
there is another class of approaches, which answers Q2 [5], [13]–[20], yet answers to Q1 are
rather intuitively explained. The key idea of the methods is to use algebraic manipulations to
disguise the original problem into an equivalent problem so that the problem data {ci}i=1:N is
somehow hidden. We refer to these approaches as algebraic transformation methods. Algebraic
transformation methods are promising in the sense that they are efficient and usually guarantee
the optimality of the solution of problem (1), though privacy of the methods is not quantified. The
approaches are typically applied to a broader class of problems, as opposed to the cryptographic
or differential privacy based approaches. Therefore it is still desirable to quantify their privacy
as response to Q1.
C. Our Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the privacy properties of a broader class
of optimization approaches, where the algebraic transformation methods are particular cases.
More specifically, the proposed privacy definition applies to 1) methods via standard objec-
tive/constraint transformations, 2) methods via standard variable transformations, 3) classical
decomposition methods, e.g., primal and dual decomposition, and 4) state-of-the-art alternating
direction method of multipliers method (ADMM).
To do this, the underlying disguise of problem data {ci}i=1:N due to those optimization
approaches is formally represented as a one-to-many binary relation between the observed
message of an adversary and an uncertainty set, in which the sensitive problem data {ci}i=1:N
itself is a member. The privacy of the associated method can then be quantified by the properties
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4of the uncertainty set. The properties of the proposed privacy measure is analyzed. Given an
optimization approach as response to Q2, our definition answers Q1. Implications of the proposed
privacy measure is discussed. Our privacy definition allows comparing the privacy of different
optimization approaches applied to a problem. It quantifies the best and the worst privacy for
an specified problem data. Several examples are given to illustrate the key ideas.
In § II we present our new proposed definitions and other basic ones, useful for describing the
privacy properties of optimization approaches. Application of the proposed privacy definitions
for optimization approaches are illustrated in § III. Conclusions are given in § IV.
Notations: Boldface lower case and upper case letters represent vectors and matrices, respec-
tively, and calligraphy letters represent sets. The Euclidean-n space and the positive integers are
denoted by IRn and IN, respectively. The superscript (·)T is the transpose. We use the notation
(a,b) to denote [aT bT]T. The identity matrix, all zero vector, and all one vector, are denoted
by I, 0, and 1, respectively. The ℓ2-norm of x is denote by ||x||2. The power set of an arbitrary
space Ω is denoted by P(Ω). A ball with radius r and center b is denoted by B(r,b). Finally,
we denote by , the component-wise inequality.
II. PRIVACY QUANTIFICATIONS
Original definitions together with other basic definitions and assumptions for quantifying the
privacy properties of the optimization approaches are given. The essential implications of the
definitions are also discussed.
A. Problem Data and the Adversary
Definition 1 (Inputs, input tuples, and messages): Consider the problem (1). We call the set
of problem data {ci}i=1:N , denoted C, the inputs of problem (1). Suppose c = f((ci)i=1:N),
where f is a possibly vector valued function with non-constant components. Moreover, suppose
that c lies in a metric space Xc. We call c, an input tuple of C. Finally, we call a finite
length data structure S
(
(ci)i=1:N
)
=
(
S1
(
(ci)i=1:N
)
, . . . , SM
(
(ci)i=1:N
))
, a message of C, where
Sj
(
(ci)i=1:N
)
represents any vector/matrix valued function. ◭
Note that elements of c represents the central components what the problem data owner cares
about. The key points of the definition is illustrated in Example 1. Throughout the paper we
consider the following assumption on the input of a problem:
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5Assumption 1: The inputs of any optimization problem of the form (1) is deterministic, and
therefore there is no associated statistical models. ◭
The considered adversarial model and its associated knowledge is defined next. The definition
of the adversary is similar to the passive eavesdroppers considered in [1, § 5.1-5.3]. We consider
the passive adversary model throughout this paper.
Definition 2 (Passive adversary): In a multi-party environment, a party involved in solving
a problem of the form (1), or even a third party, is called a passive adversary if it taps the
messages of input of (1) exchanged during different stages of the solution method, keeps a
record of possibly all the messages exchanged, and tries to discover others’ private data. ◭
Definition 3 (Adversarial knowledge): The set K of information that an adversary might ex-
ploit to discover the input of problem (1) is called the adversarial knowledge. The knowledge
can contain messages S of the problem input, which we call the inevitable knowledge. The rest
of the knowledge K \ {S} is called the auxiliary knowledge. ◭
Note that the inevitable knowledge contains messages (e.g., S, cf. Definition 1) that must be re-
vealed to a third party, such as transformed variants of inputs necessary for executing the solution
method. The auxiliary knowledge can encompass components, such as eavesdropped measures
of input elements, knowledge of optimality properties, etc., cf. Example 1. The following remark
summarizes a property of K that will be useful later.
Remark 1: For a given problem and its solution approach, the knowledge K of a third party
can be further improved and can never be decreased as time elapses. In other words, given time
t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · , we have K = Kt0 ⊆ Kt1 ⊆ Kt2 ⊆ · · · , where Kti denotes the adversarial
knowledge at time ti. As a result, unless the underlying solution method is changed, it is always
the case that Kt0 ⊆ Kt1 ⊆ Kt2 ⊆ · · · . ◭
Note that different solution methods in general can yield different sets of knowledge, even
if the problem is fixed. Finally, recall that the set C of the inputs/outputs is deterministic,
cf. Assumption 1. Therefore, the adversarial knowledge K does not contain elements such as
probability density functions or cumulative distribution functions to describe statistical models
for ci ∈ C.
Definition 4 (Obfuscation of the input and uncertainty sets): Let C, c, S, and K denote the
input, an input tuple, a message of problem (1), and the adversarial knowledge, respectively,
cf. Definition 1. Suppose S ⊆ K. We say c ∈ Xc is obfuscated if there exists a one-to-many
October 31, 2018 DRAFT
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Rc(K1)
Rc(K2)
Fig. 1: Obfuscation of an input tuple c, where S ⊆ K1, S ⊆ K2, K1 ⊆ K2, and the ellipsoids represent uncertainty
sets of c.
binary relation Rc from the singleton {S} to a nonempty set Uc ⊆ Xc, such that (S, c) ∈ Rc.
We call the (possibly unbounded) set Uc = {u | (S,u) ∈ Rc}, the uncertainty set for c. ◭
The one-to-many nature of such relations is the mechanism of achieving ambiguity in c,
cf. Figure 1. An example to clarify Definition 4 is given below:
Example 1: Consider a client-cloud environment, where the client has an optimization problem with problem
input C = {a,b}, where a,b ∈ IRn are private data that the client cares about. The cloud (potential adversary)
solves the problem for the client. Suppose that the employed deterministic solution methods for the problem is
such that client has to outsource the two scalars s1 and s2 to the cloud, where s1 = ||a||22 and s2 = bTa, that
is the message S = (s1, s2). Suppose, in addition, cloud knows n (i.e., auxiliary knowledge) and wants to find
input tuple a. Then we have Ra = {(S, a) | s1 = ||a||22, s2 = bTa,b ∈ IRn, a ∈ IRn}.
Trivially, having more knowledge of an input tuple c can only reduce the ambiguity in c. This
phenomenon is formally expressed in the following remark, cf. Figure 1.
Remark 2: Let Rc(K1) and Rc(K2) be relations defined as in Definition 4 associated with a
problem, where the inevitable knowledge is identical in both cases, i.e., K1 ⊇ S and K2 ⊇ S
for some message S. Then K1 ⊆ K2 ⇒ Uc(K1) ⊇ Uc(K2). ◭
We note that, in many interesting cases, the considered optimization approaches in this paper
can be used to realize a relation Rc as defined in Definition 4. We capitalize on the properties
of such relations resulted by optimization approaches, when quantifying the privacy.
B. Privacy Index
Given a relation R and its associated uncertainty set U that lies in a metric space X (cf. Def-
inition 4). We consider the following metrics to quantify the size and the spread of U .
1) Diameter of U , denoted d(U).
2) Counting measure of U , denoted by µ(U) [21, p. 146].
3) Affine dimension of U , denoted a(U) [22, § 2.1.3].
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7The diameter gives a measure of the worst discrepancy between any two points in the
uncertainty set. In particular, we define d(·) as follows:
Definition 5 (Diameter/center of an uncertainty set): Given an input tuple c of the input C
and c lies in a metric space Xc. Let Uc ⊆ Xc denote the uncertainty set of c. Then the diameter
d : Xc → IR ∪∞ is given by
d(Uc)=
{
2 infv supu∈Uc ||v− u|| Uc is bounded
∞ otherwise ,
(2)
where || · || is some norm on Xc. The argument v that achieves d(Uc) is called the center of Uc
and is denoted by c(Uc). If the set Uc is unbounded, we say any point in Xc achieves d(Uc),
i.e., c(Uc) is arbitrary. ◭
It is not difficult to see that the ball B(d(Uc)/2,c(Uc)), denoted BUc , is the smallest volume
ball, which encloses Uc. The metric d(Uc) for measuring the size of the uncertainty set Uc can
be interpreted and motivated as follows. Suppose the set Uc be bounded and an adversary wants
to estimate c. Because c is deterministic (cf. Assumption 1), a reasonable criterion, from the
view of the adversary, is to pick c⋆adv that minimizes the associated worst-case error ||cadv−c|| of
a candidate guess cadv. These strategies are known as worst-case robust designs, cf. [22, § 6.4.2].
From (2), it follows that c⋆adv = c(Uc) and the adversary’s worst discrepancy between its guess
c⋆adv and c is given by (1/2)d(Uc). On the other hand, if the set Uc is unbounded, a rational
adversary has no preference for one point in Xc over another. Therefore, the adversary’s worst
discrepancy is unbounded above, irrespective of its guess c⋆adv.
The counting measure of an uncertainty set is an estimate of the number elements in it [21,
p. 146], and is defined below.
Definition 6 (Counting measure of an uncertainty set): Given an input tuple c of the input C
that lies in a metric space Xc. Let Uc ⊆ Xc denote the uncertainty set of c. The counting measure
of Uc is µ(Uc), where µ:P(Xc)→IN∪∞ is
µ(A) =
{
|A| A is finite
∞ otherwise ,
(3)
with | · | denoting the cardinality of a finite set. ◭
The metric µ(Uc) for quantifying the uncertainty set Uc can be motivated as follows. If Uc
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8is finite, the value µ(Uc) can be used to quantify the adversary’s best worst-case winning 2
probability, denoted pwinw-c, and to characterizes the probability mass function (pmf) of adversary’s
guess, denoted p⋆adv, to achieve pwinw-c. Recall that c is deterministic, cf. Assumption 1. That is, the
adversary has no statistical models for describing the variation in c. Therefore, a natural criterion
for any rational adversary is to choose a probability distribution that maximizes the resulting
winning probability Pr(adversary wins), among all possible probability distributions for c. From
basic probability rules, we get pwinw-c = 1/µ(Uc) and p⋆adv = (1/µ(Uc))1, as probabilistic intuition
requires. If Uc is infinite, as our probabilistic intuition suggests, pwinw-c ought to be 0. Thus, µ(Uc)
quantifies the “practical impossibility” of an exact guess.
The last metric used to quantify the properties of Uc is its affine dimension, i.e., a(Uc).
In particular, a(Uc) is the dimension of its affine hull [22, § 2.1.3]. Roughly speaking, a(Uc)
quantifies the number of orthogonal directions, along which an adversary has to perform its
search for locating c.
Let us finally give a formal definition to quantify the privacy of optimization methods con-
sidered in this paper. To do this, we use the metrics d(·), µ(·), and a(·) discussed above.
Definition 7 (Privacy index): Let C denote the input of problem (1) and c denote any input
tuple of C that lies in a metric space Xc. Moreover, let Uc ⊆ Xc denote the uncertainty set
of c. Then we call the 3-component tuple (d(Uc), ν(Uc),a(Uc)) the privacy index of c, where
ν(Uc) = 1 − 1/µ(Uc). Moreover, the corresponding tuple is denoted by ρ(Uc), i.e., ρ(Uc) =
(d(Uc), ν(Uc),a(Uc)). ◭
Note that ν(Uc) ∈ [0, 1) is the adversary’s best worst-case loosing probability, i.e., ν(Uc) =
1− pwinw-c. Some basic properties of the ρ(·) are proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The privacy index ρ(U) has the following properties:
a) 0  ρ(U)  (∞, 1, n) for all U ⊆ IRn.
b) U is a singleton ⇔ ρ(U) = 0.
c) ρ(v + U) = ρ(U), for all v ∈ IRn and U ⊆ IRn, where v + U = {v + u | u ∈ U}.
d) ρ(PU) = ρ(U), for all unitary matrices P ∈ IRn×n and U ⊆ IRn, where PU = {Pu | u ∈
U}.
e) U ⊆ V ⇒ ρ(U)  ρ(V).
2Here the term winning refers to the event of guessing correctly c.
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9f) Let Uc,Vc ⊆ IRn denote two uncertainty sets of c. Then ρ(Uc)  ρ(Vc)⇒ ∃ U⋆,V⋆ ∈ IRn,
containing c such that ρ(Uc) = ρ(U⋆)  ρ(V⋆) = ρ(Vc), BU⋆ ⊆ BV⋆ . ◭
Proof:
a,b) The proof of these parts follow directly from the definition of the metrics d, µ, and a.
c,d) Theses parts follows from that translation and rotation do not change sets in IRn.
e) Let us first show that d(U) ≤ d(V). If at least one set of U and V is unbounded, then
d(U) ≤ d(V) holds trivially because for any unbounded W , d(W) = ∞. If U and V are
bounded, for any x ∈ IRn, gU(x) = supu∈U ||x−u|| is bounded, so is gV(x) = supv∈V ||x−v||.
Moreover, if U ⊆ V , then gU(x) ≤ gV(x) for all x ∈ IRn. Therefore, infx gU(x) = d(U) ≤
infx gV(x) = d(V) as required. The relation ν(U) ≤ ν(V) follows from that µ(U) ≤ µ(V). In
particular, (IRn,P(IRn), µ), µ being the counting measure on P(IRn), is a measure space, cf. [21,
p. 146]. Therefore, from [21, Theorem 5.1], U ⊆ V ⇒ µ(U) ≤ µ(V), i.e., ν(U) ≤ ν(V). Finally,
a(U) ≤ a(V) follows by definition.
f) Let U¯ = {PU(u+ tU) | u ∈ Uc} and V¯ = {PV(v + tv) | v ∈ Vc} for some tU , tV ∈ IRn
and unitary matrices PU ,PV ∈ IRn×n. Then from the hypothesis and from part c), d), it follows
that ρ(Uc) = ρ(U¯)  ρ(V¯) = ρ(Vc). Let us now find a particular choice t⋆U , t⋆V ,P⋆U , and P⋆V to
compute U⋆ and V⋆. If both Uc,Vc are unbounded, then choose t⋆U = 0, t⋆V = 0,P⋆U = P⋆V = I.
The result follows immediately because BU⋆ = BV⋆ = IRn ∪∞. If only Vc is unbounded, the
same choice of t⋆U , t⋆V ,P⋆U , and P⋆V yields the result, because BV⋆ = IRn ∪∞. However, if
both Uc,Vc are bounded, we have to be more specific. Recall that BUc is the smallest volume
(bounded) ball containing Uc, cf. Definition 5. Therefore, ∃ a limit point lU at the boundary of
BUc such that ∀ ǫ ≻ 0, B(ǫ, lU) ∩ Uc is nonempty, cf. Figure 2. Similarly, ∃ a limit point lV
at the boundary of BVc such that ∀ ǫ ≻ 0, B(ǫ, lV) ∩ Vc is nonempty. Then by construction,
U⋆ = {u+(c−lU ) | u ∈ Uc} and V⋆ = {Pv+(c−PlV) | v ∈ Vc} satisfy the required necessary
conditions, where P is a unitary matrix such that (aU−lU )/||aU−lU ||2 = P(aV−lV)/||aV−lV ||2,
aU = c(Uc), and aV = c(Vc), cf. Figure 2. To see this, note that the sets U⋆,V⋆ are based on
rotations and translations of the original sets Uc,Vc. In particular, t⋆U = c − lU , t⋆V = c − PlV ,
P⋆U = I, P
⋆
V = P. When u = lU , we conclude that c ∈ U⋆ and, so is c ∈ V⋆. Moreover, the
rotation induced by P ensures BU⋆ ⊆ BV⋆, cf. Figure 2.
This completes the proof of the Proposition.
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c
lV
lU
(a)
(lU − aU )
(lV − aV )
(b)
P(lV − aV )
(c)
Fig. 2: Proposition 1-(f): (a) Original sets Uc (shaded box) and Vc (solid rectangular wire frame); (b) A
representation of intermediate steps, where the Uc and Vc are shifted, yet they still contains c; (c) Sets U⋆ (shaded
box) and V⋆ (solid rectangular wire frame).
As we will see next, Proposition 1 is useful for explaining interesting implications of the
privacy index. Especially, the parts a), b) e), and f) of Proposition 1 are more relevant.
C. Implications of the Privacy Index
By definition, the privacy index ρ lies in the extended IR3 and is nonnegative, cf. Proposition 1-
a). Moreover, Proposition 1-a) provides the smallest and the largest possible values of ρ for an
input-tuple in IRn. Note that if an uncertainty set Uc is a singleton, then it contains c only,
cf. Definition 4. Therefore, from Proposition 1-b), ρ(Uc) = 0 ⇔ Uc = {c}. Thus, ρ = 0
signifies zero privacy, where an adversary can exactly determine the associated input tuple.
Proposition 1-e) and f) provide a mechanism to compare different ρ vectors, wherefore the
privacy of different solution methods can be compared. Proposition 1-e) and Remark 1 ensure
that the optimization based approaches lacks robustness to adversarial attacks, such as those
involving side information. In addition, Proposition 1-e) is useful to compute lower bounds for
ρ of a complicated uncertainty set. The converse of Proposition 1-e) does not holds in general.
Proposition 1-f) is a weaker form of e): given a nonincreasing (with respect to IR3+) sequence{
ρ
(
U
(n)
c
)}N
n
, ∃ a sequence
{
U¯
(n)
c
}N
n
of sets, each containing c and B
U¯
(1)
c
⊇ · · · ⊇ B
U¯
(N)
c
⊇ {c}.
Thus, Proposition 1-f) gives a way to compare the privacy of two algorithms given the privacy
indexes, irrespective of the underlying solution machinery. In addition, Proposition 1-f) suggests
a natural ordering of privacy indexes in general, (Figure 3) providing meanings to the smallest
(i.e., 0) and the largest (i.e., (∞, 1, n)) privacy for an input tuple c ∈ IRn, cf. Proposition 1-a).
III. OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES AND THEIR PRIVACY
In this section, standard optimization approaches are concisely presented, cf. Q2 § I-A. Exam-
ples are given to quantify the privacy of these optimization approaches, cf. Q1. All the examples
October 31, 2018 DRAFT
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a(Uc)
ν(Uc)
ν(Uc) = 0.8750
a(Uc) = 2
Uc = {c ∈ IR7 |· · · · · · }
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
00.5
0.75
0.9 arrows ⇒ improvements in K
Fig. 3: Feasible ρ(Uc) for a fixed d(Uc). The privacy corresponds to the points in the upper-right shaded area are
better than that of the points in lower-left shaded area. Rest of the points are incomparable.
are designed specifically to illustrate our point.
A. Transformation of Objective and Constraint Functions
Suppose ψ0 : ID0 ⊆ IR → IR is monotonically increasing and ID0 ⊇ range(f0). Moreover,
suppose ψi : IDi ⊆ IR → IR, with IDi ⊇ range(gi), is such that ψi(z) ≤ 0 ⇔ z ≤ 0 and
ϕi : IR → IR is such that ϕ(z) = 0 ⇔ z = 0. Let P denote the problem formed by using
ψ0(f0(x)), ψi(gi(x)), and ϕi(hi(x)), instead of f0(x), gi(x), and hi(x), respectively. Here gi
and hi are ith component of g and h, respectively. Then x⋆ solves P if and only if it solves
problem (1). With this method, potential obfuscation of problem data (cf. Definition 4) is directly
linked to the function compositions, ψ0(f0(·)), ψi(gi(·)), and ϕi(hi(·)).
Scaling used in [5], [18]–[20] is a particular case of the objective and constrained transfor-
mation. In [15], authors handle their affine constraint functions, denoted Ax−b=0, by using
ϕ(z)=Bz, where B is full column rank with the desired properties Ax−b=0⇔B(Ax−b)=0.
Now, we present a new, yet an important example to convey the idea.
Example 2 (Localization from range measurements): Suppose the area A ∈ IR2 with d(A) = D contains N
military deployed beacons, denoted i = 1, . . . , N , that serve civilian boats to locate their positions. Let x¯ ∈ IR2
denote the position of boat B. The range measurements, denoted yi ∈ IR and ai ∈ IR2, i = 1, . . . , N , from the
beacons are received by B to compute its location x. In particular, yi and ai are the distance and the unit vector,
respectively, from B to beacon i. Assuming a linear measurement model with unknown noise, an estimate xˆ of
x is given by the solution of the problem, minimize||Ax− y||2, where the variable is x ∈ IR2, and the problem
data are A = −[a1, . . . , aN ]T and y = (y1, . . . , yN ). However, due to security reasons, military beacons do not
want to send their range measurements, which are simply the polar coordinates of their positions, with respect
to B. Now the idea is to simply use the objective transformation ψ0(z) = z2, and let B solve
minimizex xT(
∑N
i=1 aia
T
i )x+ 2(
∑N
i=1 yia
T
i )x , x
TA¯x+ 2y¯Tx .
The beacons communicate with each other to compute A¯ and y¯, which is transmitted to B, i.e., the message
S=(A¯, y¯). Let us now explore the privacy of this method on the input tuple c=y1a1, the location of beacon 1.
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Without loss of generality, let x¯=(0, 0). Suppose B knows by definition ||a1||=1, A¯=a1aT1+
∑N
i=2(aia
T
i ),
3) y¯=y1a1+
∑N
i=2 yiai, yi>0, and, of course, N=N0, i.e., the auxiliary knowledge. Thus, Uc = {c =
y¯
x¯
(a)
y¯ c1
c2
(b)
y¯
x¯
A1
A2
(c)
y1a1 | ||a1|| = 1, ai∈E(A¯), y1a1=(y¯−
∑N0
i=2 yiai), ||ai||=1 ∀i=2, . . . , N0, yi≤D ∀i=1, . . . , N0}, where E(A¯) =
{a | aTA¯−1a≤1}. Note that ai∈E(A¯) ∀i is a necessary condition, by definition of A¯. Let us next compute ρ(Uc).
We first build some intuition of Uc. The figure above illustrates all possible cases, the circle and the shaded
area represent the unit circle O and the ellipse E , respectively. So, a1 ∈ O ∩ E . Note that yi is simply the
magnitude of some vector in IR2, which is spanned by vectors in O ∩ E . Now consider scenario 1, where
N0 > 2. The scenario 1-cases (a),(b) yield ρ1,a,b(Uc) = (D, 1, 2), where the subscript of ρ denotes the scenario
and the cases. The scenario 1-case (c) yields ρ1,c(Uc) = (D, 1, 1). Now consider scenario 2, where N0 = 2.
Clearly, the scenario 2-case (a) doesn’t exist. If scenario 2-case (b), O ∩ E is a set with 4 points, i.e., a1 is on
one of the 4 points, cf. the open circles in (b). Moreover, because B knows y¯, c = y1a1 is either at c1 or c2,
i.e., Uc = {c1, c2}, cf. figure (b). Thus, ρ2,b(Uc) = (||c1 − c2||, 0.5, 1). If scenario 2-case (c), we similarly get
Uc = A1A2, the line segment of length D, cf. figure (c), i.e., ρ2,c(Uc) = (D, 1, 1). The ρ when N0 = 1 is
similarly computed.
Based on our privacy index, ρ1,a,b ≥ ρ1,c = ρ2,c ≥ ρ2,b. The first inequality clearly agrees with out intuition.
The second equality agrees with our intuition in the sense that the ambiguity in c is identical in the associated
two settings. The last inequality can be intuitively explained as follows: scenario 1,2-case (c) corresponds to a
setting where the beacon measurements are linearly dependent, and therefore the beacon 1 can be any point along
the line A1A2, as opposed to scenario 2-case (b), where the beacon measurements are not linearly dependent.
B. Transformation via Change of Variables
Suppose the decision variable x in problem (1) is in IRn. Let φ : IRm → IRn be a function such
that range(φ) ⊇
⋂
i dom(gi). Now consider the problem, denoted Q, achieved by the change
of variables x = φ(z). Then Q is equivalent to problem (1) in the sense that if z⋆ solves Q,
then x⋆ = φ(z⋆) solves problem (1). Note again that any potential obfuscation of problem data
(cf. Definition 4) is directly linked to the function compositions, f0(φ(·)), g(φ(·)), and h(φ(·)).
All the approaches in [5], [13], [14], [16]–[20] can be obtained as a particular case of the
change of variables. In particular, those methods uses an affine φ. Let us now give an example
for a case where φ is not necessarily affine.
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Example 3 (Resource allocation): Suppose an ammunition supply depot (ASD) wants to transfer N -types of
nuclear-ammunition to the war field. Let βi denote the radiation per unit volume of ith ammunition type. The
overall radiation should be no greater than a specified value γ. The containers for each type i should be cubic of
length xi. The criterion for computing the volume of type i is determine by the penalty function αi/xi, where
αi denote the priority levels of the ith type. Suppose the ASD relies on a third party to compute the desired
container box lengths x⋆ = (x⋆i )i=1:N , by minimizing
∑N
i=1(αi/xi) subject to
∑n
i=1 βix
3
i ≤ γ and x ≥ 0. The
problem data is αi > 0, βi > 0, and γ > 0. On the other hand, suppose the ASD does not want to reveal the
input tuples (αi, βi), i = 1, . . . , N .
What if ASD uses the change of variable xi = φi(zi) = αi exp(zi) for all i. Then it is sufficient to ask
the third party (say B) to minimize ∑Ni=1 exp(−zi) subject to ∑Ni=1 si exp(3zi) ≤ 1, with variable z =
(z1, . . . , zN) and problem parameters si = (βiα3i /γ). This method requires the transmission of the message
S = (si)i=1:N to B. Suppose B knows the dependence of si on αi, βi, γ and the positivity of αi, βi, γ. Therefore,
U(αi,βi)={(αi, βi) | si=βiα
3
i /γ, βi, αi, γ > 0}, which corresponds to ρ(U(αi,βi)) = (∞, 1, 2). This is the highest
possible privacy for an input tuple in IR2, cf. Proposition 1-(a).
One can readily apply hybrid variants of the transformation via change of variables and
transformation of objective and constraints, cf. [18], [20].
C. Decomposition Methods
In this section, we highlight important aspects of decomposition methods for preserving privacy
of problem data. In particular, the dual decomposition method is considered. Arguments, in the
case of primal decomposition methods and ADMM method are similar.
We start by noting that the decomposition methods are applied whenever the problem structure
inherently possesses some separability properties, where the original problem can be solved by
coordinating smaller subproblems, one for each subsystem. Thus, instead of problem (1), the
general problem we consider in this section is given by
minimize
∑N
i=1 fi(xi,yi; ci)
subject to (xi,yi) ∈ Gi(ci), i = 1, ..., N
yi = Eiz, i = 1, ..., N ,
(4)
where the variables are (xi,yi)i=1:N and z, and i denotes the subsystem index. Typically, xi, yi
and z are called local, interface, and global variables, respectively. The matrix Ei is a 0-1 matrix
that maps z into the interface variables yi. This mapping accounts for the coupling of the problem
and ensures consensus between subsystem interface variables and the global variables. The set
Gi(ci) is the constraints at the subsystem i and is dependent on the private problem data ci. Let
us now summarize the standard dual decomposition algorithm and see how it preserves privacy
for private data ci.
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Algorithm 1: Dual Decomposition
Given λ = (λ1, . . . ,λN ) such that ETλ = 0. Set k = 1.
while (stopping criterion)
1. Subsystem i minimizes fi(xi,yi; ci) + λTi yi subject to (xi,yi) ∈ Gi(ci), with (xi,yi). Let
(
x
(k)
i
(ci),y
(k)
i
(ci)
)
denote the solution.
2. Subsystems coordinate to update global z, i.e., z := (ETE)−1ET
(
y
(k)
1 (c1), . . . ,y
(k)
N
(cN )
)
.
3. Subsystem i updates λi as, λi := λi + αk
(
y
(k)
i
(ci)−Eiz
)
. Set k := k + 1.
In the algorithm above, αk is an appropriate step size [23]. As far as the privacy of the problem
data is concerned, the crucial step of the algorithm is step 2. This is because the coordination
requires exchange of messages, which are dependent on the problem data. In particular, the
ith subsystem requires revealing message, denoted Sduali , where Sduali =
(
y
(k)
i (ci)
)
k=1:T
and T
is the number of iteration before the algorithm termination. Note that y(k)i (ci) is, in fact, the
subgradients of dual master objective function [23]. Therefore, any potential obfuscation of
problem data of subsystem i is directly linked to the computed subgradients until the algorithm
termination, i.e., Sduali . An example is given below.
Example 4 (Average consensus): Consider the computation of the arithmetic average c¯ of N > 2 scalars,
denoted c1, . . . , cN , where each ci is private to subsystem i. Note that c¯ is simply the argument y that minimizes∑N
i=1(y − ci)
2
. This minimization can be equivalently posed as
minimize
∑N
i=1(yi − ci)
2
subject to yi = z, i = 1, . . . , N ,
(5)
with variables (yi)i=1:N and z. Let us next show, without loss of generality, how Algorithm 1 achieves privacy
for input tuple c1 of subsystem 1, given adversary is N .
Note that the step 1 of Algorithm 1 is
y
(k)
i (ci) := (ci − λi/2) . (6)
The step 2 is simply the average z := (1/N)
∑N
i=1(ci − λi/2) and step 3 is λi := λi + αk
(
y
(k)
i (ci)− z
)
. Thus,
the message exposed by subsystem 1 to subsystem N is S1 =
(
y
(k)
1 (c1)
)
k=1:T
, where T is the total iterations.
Without explicitly describing the relation Rc1 (or equivalently the uncertainty set Uc1), we use an alternative
method, where the associated ρ(Uc1) is computed by construction. Now note that if for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, ci and
λi satisfy (6) for all k = 1, . . . , T , so is cˆi(θi) = (ci − θi, λi − 2θi), where θ = (θi)i=1:N−1 is chosen such that
1Tθ = 0. Indeed, θ1 here parameterizes the uncertainty set Uc1 . In particular, Uc1 = {c1− θ1 | 1Tθ = 0}, which
yields ρ(Uc1) = (∞, 1, 1). This is the highest possible privacy for an input tuple in IR, cf. Proposition 1-a).
Even though, we assume that subsystem N is a passive adversary (cf. Definition 2), it is easily seen that, even
if r number of subsystems collude, ρ(Uc1) = (∞, 1, 1) remains intact, given r < N − 1. In other words, as long
as subsystem 1 has at least one reliable subsystem j, j 6= 1, ρ(Uc1) = (∞, 1, 1).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a mechanism to quantify the privacy of a broader class of optimization approaches
was proposed. We defined a one-to-many relation, which relates a given adversarial observed
message to an uncertainty set of the problem data. The privacy measure was then designed
based on the uncertainty sets. The properties of the proposed privacy measure was analyzed.
From the definition it is clear that optimization based approaches lacks robustness to adversarial
attacks, such as those involving side information. Our privacy definition clearly model those
intrinsic properties of optimization approaches. The key ideas were illustrated by examples.
An important possible extensions is to explore ways of designing optimization approaches to
guarantee a specified privacy level.
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